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TAX POLICY, LOCATION CHOICES, AND
MARKET STRUCTURE*
GERARD A. PFANN
Maastricht University
and HANS VAN KRANENBURG
Maastricht University
Abstract
A structural model of entry and fiscal policy is presented. It shows that taxation
of variable production costs can increase product prices, lower competition, and
reduce the availability of new products in small markets. The model’s test is based
on a unique nationwide fiscal experiment. We study the effects of the 1869 Stamped
Paper Tax Reform Act on the market for daily newspapers in the Netherlands. The
econometric analysis uses data on when and where the newspapers existed and were
introduced together with demographic census data from 1859 and 1869. The results
confirm the model’s predictions and show how taxation affects strategic business
location decisions.
I. Introduction
Every morning, when you opened the morning newspaper, “cut”
was the most common noun, “cut” was the most regular verb.
[Sir Malcom Bradbury, Cuts (1987)]
This paper shows that fiscal policy has a direct impact on business location
decisions of firms, production, competition, and the structure of markets.
Taxes levied on the costs of production lower the profitability of firms,
discourage markets from growing, dampen competition, and suppress the
development of new industries. Usually we do not observe cost-reducing
shocks, let alone their exact timing. This is why quantifying the effects of
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ometrics and Organization, Business Investment Research Center (BIRC), Maastricht Univer-
sity, and Centre for Economic Policy Research; and Assistant Professor, Department of Strategy,
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to share with us his profound and encyclopedic knowledge about the Dutch daily newspapers
in general and about the “Dagbladzegel” in particular. We thank Dennis Carlton, Paul Geroski,
Boyan Jovanovic, Marc van Wegberg, and a referee for helpful and stimulating comments. We
are grateful to Margard Ody for kindly editing the paper’s final draft. Gerard Pfann thanks the
University of Chicago Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies for its hos-
pitality and the N.W.O.-PIONIER program of the Netherlands Foundation for Scientific Re-
search for providing financial support. All errors are ours.
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taxation on firms’ profits and on the organization of markets is uncommon
in the structural-empirical literature on public finance and industrial organ-
ization. As a result of this lack of information, it has long been thought that
fiscal policy and governmental incentive programs did not have a large impact
on location choices of firms.1 Later results—arguably blurred by severe iden-
tification problems—gave at most a vague image of that relationship.2
Only quite recently, a ground-breaking study comparing differences in
economic activity along borders of states that vary in particular probusiness
or antibusiness legislations provided convincing evidence that governmental
policy can indeed influence decisions on where firms set up their plants.3
Thomas J. Holmes’s model of antibusiness versus probusiness states is es-
sentially static, and the empirical study is a cross-section analysis at one
point in time. Our paper aims to extend the literature by adding a dynamic
dimension to the business location model. We investigate entry decisions and
realized location choices in condensed markets aroused by a pregnant change
in corporate tax law.
Existing theoretical models of entry and taxation assume either imperfect
competition or monopolists’ provision of new goods.4 Free-entry models
relating entry to zero-profits thresholds of equilibrium demand have been
developed to study how entry in concentrated markets changes the profita-
bility of firms without the necessity to observe price cost margins of incum-
bent and entering firms.5 Free-entry models are helpful to quantify how cost-
reducing shocks affect profitability as a result of the change in market
structure. The model presented in this paper links imperfect-competition
models with free-entry models. We study how prices, profits, and entry into
1 Dennis W. Carlton, The Location and Employment Choices of New Firms: An Econometric
Model with Discrete and Continuous Endogenous Variables, 65 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 440 (1983),
simultaneously modeled the decisions of businessmen about where to locate their plants and
of state planners about how to best attract new employment to their state.
2 See Michael Wasylenko, Empirical Evidence on Interregional Business Location Decisions
and the Role of Fiscal Incentives in Economic Development, in Industry Location and Public
Policy 13 (Henry H. Herzog, Jr., & Alan M. Schlottmann eds. 1991), for an overview of the
literature until the late eighties.
3 Thomas J. Holmes, The Effect of State Policies on the Location of Manufacturing: Evidence
from State Borders, 106 J. Pol. Econ. 667 (1998), finds that there is a large, abrupt increase
in business activity when one crosses a state border from a state that does not have a right-
to-work law into a state that does. Thomas J. Holmes, Scale of Local Production and City
Size, 89 Am. Econ. Rev. Pap. & Proc. 317 (1999), argues that the equilibrium output of any
particular locally produced differentiated product depends on the local population size.
4 Models of imperfect competition were developed in Jesus K. Seade, On the Effects of
Entry, 48 Econometrica 479 (1980); and Timothy J. Besley, Commodity Taxation and Imperfect
Competition: A Note on the Effects of Entry, 40 J. Pub. Econ. 359 (1989); the model of
monopolists’ provision of new goods is based on Paul M. Romer, New Goods, Old Theory,
and the Welfare Costs of Trade Restrictions, 43 J. Dev. Econ. 5 (1994).
5 See Timothy F. Bresnahan & Peter C. Reiss, Entry and Competition in Concentrated
Markets, 99 J. Pol. Econ. 977 (1991); and Steve Berry, Estimation of a Model of Entry in the
Airline Industry, 60 Econometrica 889 (1992).
tax policy and market structure 63
concentrated markets changed when a tax that increased the variable costs
of production was eliminated. The theoretical model predicts effects that are
comparable to those predicted by theories of cost-reducing technological
shocks: new firms enter, commodity prices fall, more customers are served,
and firms’ profits increase.6 We find that the minimum efficient scale to
warrant profitable entry for a monopolist is larger if the tax rate on variable
costs of production increases. Given the size of the population, an increase
in expected variable profits increases the probability of accommodating man-
ifold firms in the concentrated marketplace.
The predictions generated by the theoretical model are tested using a
uniquely identified nationwide fiscal experiment that drastically changed the
market structure for daily newspapers in the Netherlands. On July 1, 1869,
21 years after the freedom of press was written into the New Constitution
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, a new constitutional law was implemented
that repealed the Stamped Paper Tax (see Figure 1). Tax stamps on paper
used for news provision were no longer legally allowed. Their elimination
reduced the variable costs of producing newspapers by as much as 50 percent.
The expansion that followed immediately after the installation of the 1869
tax repeal was the largest the Dutch market for newspapers experienced
during its growth until World War II.
In addition to the information on when and where daily newspapers existed
and entered, geographical information and demographic census data from
1859 and 1869 are collected to investigate relevant differentiations among
possible entry locations. The econometric analysis shows that publishers in
the largest cities, facing sufficient demand to accommodate multiple news-
papers, profited most from the change in competitive conduct induced by
the abolishment of the tax on paper used for printing news. Most of the
localities that were newly chosen to start up a daily newspaper were towns
that had a modest population but had grown substantially in the decade
preceding the 1869 tax reform. These towns were usually located far away
from a province’s largest city—usually its capital city—which was usually
already served by at least one newspaper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the historical back-
ground of the Stamped Paper Tax and the arguments used against it at the
time it was abolished. In Section III, a structural model is presented that
describes how entry choices depend on fiscal policy and market structures.
Section IV summarizes the information available in the data and presents
the results of the econometric analysis. This part of the paper focuses on
how changes in profitability explain the way entry occurred and the dominant
factors determining the entry choices of single newspapers. Section V
concludes.
6 See Boyan Jovanovic & Glenn M. MacDonald, The Life Cycle of a Competitive Industry,
102 J. Pol. Econ. 322 (1994).
Figure 1.—Repeal of the Stamped Paper Tax
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TABLE 1
Stamped Newspaper Tax Revenues per Province in the Netherlands in 1826
Province Largest City
Number of
Stamped
Papers (#1,000)
Stamped Paper
Tax Revenues
(#1,000 Dfl)
North Holland Amsterdam 2,206 44.1
South Holland Rotterdam 726 14.5
North Brabant ’s Hertogenbosch 40 .8
Zeeland Middelburg 82 1.6
Friesland Leeuwarden 286 5.7
Utrecht Utrecht 60 1.2
Gelderland Arnhem 137 2.7
Overijssel Zwolle 37 .7
Drenthe Assen 9 .2
Groningen Groningen 156 3.1
Limburg Maastricht 42 .8
Total 3,782 75.6
Note.—Dfl p Dutch guilders.
Source.—Joan M. H. J. Hemels, De Pers onder het Juk van een Fiscale Druk 170 (1992).
II. The 1869 Newspaper Tax Reform Act7
The stamped paper duty was left over from the “timbre extraordinaire pour
journaux, gazettes, feuilles pe´riodiques ou papiers-nouvelles” that was part
of the French empire’s tax laws that had been installed 1 year after the
annexation of the Netherlands in 1810. To keep governmental control over
the information flowing to citizens, stamped paper was the only legally al-
lowed means for distributing news, advertisements, and other announcements
in print among the general public (for example, newspapers). Detailed in-
formation on the sums of money flowing into the government’s treasury and
the number of papers actually stamped is available for every Dutch province
in the year 1826 and is listed in Table 1. In that year, the average revenue
was 2 cents or .02 Dutch guilders (Dfl) per stamped paper. The “right to
stamp” was a taxation that was based on the size of the paper used for
printing and publishing. For a piece of paper the size of two palms
( ), no stamp was required. For larger newspapers,21 palmp 10# 10 cm
the tariffs as of April 1, 1849, are presented in Table 2. The figures on the
1868 financial balance sheet of the Algemeen Handelsblad, an influential
daily newspaper, are illustrative of the fact that the stamp tax weighed heavily
on exploitation and must have stifled publishers’ entrepreneurial initiatives:
7 Joan M. H. J. Hemels, Het Dagbladzegel in de Rariteitenkamer, 1869–1969 (1969), and
Joan M. H. J. Hemels, De Pers onder het Juk van een Fiscale Druk (1992), provide detailed
descriptive information on the effects of the repeal of the stamped newspaper tax in 1869. The
historical information presented in Section II of this paper relies to a large extent on these two
publications in Dutch.
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TABLE 2
Tariff Rules of Stamped Paper Tax on
April 1, 1849
Size (in palm2) Tariff (in Dfl)
From 0 to 2 0
From 2 to 15 .01
From 15 to 20 .015
From 20 to 25 .02
From 25 to 30 .025
From 30 to 35 .03
From 35 to 40 .035
From 40 to 45 .04
For every additional 10
(or part of ) Add .005
Note.—Dfl p Dutch guilders.
Source.—Joan M. H. J. Hemels, De Pers onder
het Juk van een Fiscale Druk 47 (1992).
total expenses were 299,000 Dfl, which included the listed amount paid that
year to the tax authorities for stamped paper duties of 143,000 Dfl, or 48
percent. These numbers show that the per-unit paper tax was proportional to
total variable costs and that variable costs were linear in output.
After 1848, when freedom of speech, press, and expression were written
into the New Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the stamped
paper duty represented one of the last remaining obstacles to be removed
from the route to economic freedom of the press. On April 17, 1867, an
influential group of Dutch intellectuals founded the “Anti–Stamp Duty Al-
liance.” The arguments put forward to persuade the government to abolish
the newspaper tax law were based on three grounds:
1. Fundamentally political: A free press is a sine qua non for a
parliamentary-constitutionally ruled country. Repeal of the stamped paper
duty creates opportunities for new newspapers to be set up and to break
down the existing monopolistic structure.
2. Socioeconomic: The imposition of a large levy on a newspaper’s gross
income is disadvantageous not only for the newspapers themselves: trade
and industry suffer losses as well.
3. Cultural: Taxation on the spread of knowledge keeps news beyond the
reach of many.
On November 10, 1868, the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, another
widely read daily newspaper, wrote, “Is it not an anomaly that the State
spends a fortune on education, while keeping people from decent and in-
expensive daily readings through a stamp tax levied upon newspapers?” In
fact, all incumbent prominent newspapers were in favor of the abolition of
the newspaper tax as well. Publishers regarded the repeal of the stamped
paper duty as a means of improving the literacy of Dutch citizens. Being
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responsible for approximately half of the production costs, its repeal would
widen the distribution of information they struggled to provide. The Stamped
Paper Tax prevented newspaper publishers from using their capital for the
improvement and enforcement of their informational powers and contents.
Incumbent newspapers actually welcomed more competition. The tax cut was
expected to widen and liberalize the market for newspapers. Not only would
it enhance competition, it would also increase the availability of information
and increase incumbents’ opportunities to grow and survive when profits and
sales rose as a result of the upward shock in the demand for newspapers in
general. Income losses from lower prices due to increased competition were
expected to be offset by the increased readership served by those best
equipped to face it, in casu, the existing newspapers.
The tax on paper for printing news was officially repealed on July 1, 1869
(Figure 1). The tax cut not only considerably lowered variable production
costs but also induced an increase in the number of available newspapers
and a decrease in the real aggregate price level. Following the installation
of the 1869 tax law, the number of available newspapers increased from 41
to 62 nationwide in the period 1869–71. It is relevant to note that most of
the new papers had titles like “general daily newspaper” or “new general
daily newspaper.”8 The market expansion went hand in hand with a 50 percent
drop in the aggregate price for newspapers. Such a change in a comparatively
short period of time was the largest the market for newspapers has experi-
enced in the entire life cycle of the industry (Figure 2). The reasons for this
significant price drop are twofold. First, the Stamped Paper Tax was ad
valorem taxation in the sense that the per-unit tax was included in the price
for newspapers. It could thus be regarded as a revenue taxation on newspaper
providers. Moreover, the change in the market structure after the tax re-
peal—the increase in competition in big cities and the access of monopolists
to smaller towns—also reduced the aggregate price level of newspapers. Thus,
entry occurred in two different ways: seven newspapers appeared as mon-
opolists in towns that did not have a newspaper before, while 14 entered
cities where other newspapers were already available. Interestingly, in many
towns served by one or at most two newspapers, the market structure did
not alter. We seek answers to the question, why did entry occur like this?
The model presented in the next section provides a theoretical explanation.
III. A Model of Taxation and Entry
The model describes the role of taxation and population on market struc-
tures and the profitability of firms. It starts with the analysis of monopolists’
8 Segregation or religious compartmentalization of the newspaper market in the Netherlands
developed much more than 2 decades later, in the late 1890s.
Figure 2.—The life cycle of daily newspapers in the Netherlands, 1848–1996
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access to geographically isolated markets and is then followed by entry into
existing concentrated markets.
A. Entry as a Monopolist
We investigate the effects of levying taxes on the costs of producing
information, on the equilibrium price for information, and on the amount of
information provided in each market.9
Suppose that a town can produce two types of goods: old goods or new
goods. The production of new goods requires information and skilled labor
as inputs. A country’s gross domestic product consists of the total production
from towns. In M towns, old goods are produced, while the N townsM N
produce new goods. Each town can manufacture old goods, but as soon as
sufficient information is available, the town changes from producing old
goods to producing new goods. The new good, Y, is produced using a constant
returns-to-scale technology that varies exogenously with each town i’s dem-
ographics . The necessary inputs to produce are information and skilledZ Y Xi i i
labor , which is assumed to be proportional to the town’s total populationLi
. In towns, the provision of information is in the hands of monopolists.S Ni 1
The total production of new goods produced in towns with monopolistic
information providers is and yieldsY1
N N1 1
1a aY p Y p S (Z ) X , 0 ! a ! 1. (1) 1 1i 1 i i
ip1 ip1
The setup costs ( ) for a monopolist to provide in town i are fixed andF W X1 i i
depend on a vector of exogenous town-specific characteristics, . The var-Wi
iable production costs for an additional unit of yields , ),X (1 t)C (V Wi 1 i i
where is a vector of demographic variables affecting the demand forV Xi i
and t is the rate of taxation levied on the variable costs of production. The
tax rate t is equal for all towns. Once the firm has entered town i, it sets
and a monopoly price to maximize variable profits. The monopolist’sX pi i
decision problem is
max p (X )X  (1 t)C (V, W )X , (2)i i i 1 i i i
p, X
where
1a a1p (X )p aS (Z ) X . (3)i i 1 i i
The equilibrium price is equal to
( )p*(V, W , a, t)p 1 t /a C (V, W ), (4)[ ]i i i 1 i i
9 This part of the model is closely related to Romer’s, supra note 4, model of new goods.
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so a cost-reducing tax shock leads to a lower equilibrium price level, or
.dp*/dt 1 0i
The equilibrium provision of information is
2 1/(a1)( )X*(V, W , Z , a, t)p 1 t/a C (V, W ) S (Z ), (5)[ ]i i i i 1 i i 1 i
which shows that the equilibrium outcome of cost-reducing tax shocks yields
more production of information, or . Moreover, we find that indX*/dt 1 0i
equilibrium is positively correlated with the size of the population inX*i
town i, or .dX*/dS (Z ) 1 0i 1 i
The explicit formulation of the equilibrium ( ) allows us to derivep*; X*i i
the effect of taxation on the minimum population size that warrants profitable
entry as a monopolist. The total profits of town i’s monopolist are
P p [p*(V, W , Z , a, t) (1 t)C (V, W )]1i i i i i 1 i i
# X*(V, W , Z , a, t) F (W ),
(6)
i i i i 1 i
or, omitting addenda for computational convenience, we find that
[a/(a1)]P p S (1 t) W  F , (7)1 1 1 1
where does not depend on or on the tax rate t. From equation (7), itW S1 1
is easy to show that profits are smaller when taxes are larger, or dP /dt !1
. A direct comparison of entry thresholds, , under different tax0 P p 01
regimes yields
S (t)1 [a/(1a)]p (1 t) , (8)
S (0)1
assuming that the other variables do not change pre- and post-tax. This
expression shows that , so the minimum efficient scale thatS (t) 1 S (0)1 1
warrants profitable entry for a monopolist increases with the tax rate t on
variable costs of production.
B. Entry into Existing Markets
In this part of the model, we consider a second local market structure for
the production of new goods. Suppose that one market accommodates
firms, while another market has firms. The total number ofn p 1 n 1 11 2
markets in the economy with firms is equal to . When firmsn N { N N2 2 1
are facing a downward-sloping demand curve and the size of the market
increases, market demand rotates outward.10
Figure 3 illustrates that although the change in equilibrium price level may
be small when the market structure remains unchanged, the difference can
10 The entry threshold methodology used in this part of the model was first presented by
Bresnahan & Reiss, supra note 5. That study also gave a detailed analytical description of the
outward rotation effect.
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Figure 3.—The entry effect of tax changes on prices and quantities
be quite substantial when competition increases. The equilibria in the two
markets are {A: [ ( ); ( )]} and {B: [ ( ); ( )]}. A costs-reducingt t t tP n Q n P n Q n1 1 2 2
tax shock shifts these to {C: [P( ); Q( )]} for the market with firms andn n n1 1 1
to {D: [P( ); Q( )]} for the market with firms. Figure 3 also allows usn n n2 2 2
to study the impact of the tax cut for the smaller local market with firms.n1
It can be twofold. First, without entry, there is the pure elasticity effect. The
market moves from A to C along the same demand curve D( ). Second, then1
tax cut may induce entry of firms. The equilibrium price level thenn  n2 1
falls from P( ) to P( ), while the equilibrium output increases with ann n1 2
additional . As a result, we find that entry induces prices toQ(n )Q(n )2 1
fall and that fall is more substantial the more concentrated the market is prior
to the shock.
In towns with an oligopoly market structure and with Cournot competition
among n identical firms, the average profit for each firm yields
[a/(a1)]P p (S /n)(1 t) W  F . (9)n n n n
Also, in concentrated markets we find that profits per firm are smaller when
taxes are larger, or . The break-even point for the nth firm isdP /dt ! 0n
. Other things being equal, an increase in variable profits lowers theP p 0n
minimum efficient scale to accommodate n firms, since . WhenS (t) 1 S (0)n n
entry occurs, however, and allowing for and to vary among towns, theF Wn n
overall effect of a tax reduction is difficult to predict. In general, the setup
costs are unknown and prices at the town level are not observed. If we also
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allow for the possibility that, given characteristics V and W, later entrants
have lower variable profits and higher setup costs, so andW p W F pn n1 n
, then the model becomes much more difficult to solve analytically.Fn1
We shall thus rely on an empirical approach to actually estimate the change
in profit margins. An entry threshold is a scale-free unit that contains infor-
mation about the effect of entry on profit margins. How tax reform changes
competition and market structure can be inferred from changes in profit
margins between markets with and n firms expressed by the followingn 1
ratio:
S /n s F Wn n n n1
p p . (10)
S /n 1 s F Wn1 n1 n1 n
The more this ratio deviates from 1, the larger the difference in market power
and hence in profit margins between the nth and the ( )th firm.n 1
IV. An Econometric Analysis of Taxation, Entry Thresholds,
and Location Decisions
In the early years of newspaper publishing, general information was often
locally available only through the distribution of newspapers. As mentioned
in the Alliance’s second and third arguments, the transfer of knowledge and
of new information occurred by means of daily newspapers rather than by
science books or academic journals. Books were available only through spe-
cialized libraries in university towns. Journals as we know them today hardly
existed. Table 3 compares demographic data obtained from the 1859 and
1869 censuses with information on when and where newspapers existed and
were introduced in the period 1869–71. The census data used in this study
are obtained from Statistics Netherlands.11
In 1869, before the tax cut, 42 daily newspapers were published in 31
towns. Two years after the repeal, another 21 newspapers were added. Two-
thirds of the newcomers entered large cities where other newspapers already
existed: Amsterdam (5), Arnhem (2), ’s Hertogenbosch (1), The Hague
(1), Groningen (1), Maastricht (1), and Rotterdam (3). The average
population of those cities was 85,100 citizens in 1869. One-third of the new
entrants started a new business in provincial towns where no other newspapers
were available at that time. The average population of these towns was 12,300
(Den Helder, Deventer, Enkhuizen, Harlingen, Roosendaal, Tilburg, and Win-
schoten) (Figure 4). The smallest town that added a monopolist newspaper
after 1869 was Enkhuizen, with a population of 5,400. In 25 towns that
jointly held 28 newspapers at the time of the 1869 tax reform, no new journals
11 The censuses of the period 1795–1971 have been made available by Central Bureau of
Statistics Netherlands (CBS) on cdrom. See CBS, Publicaties Volkstellingen, 1795–1971
(1999).
TABLE 3
Changes in Market Structures due to the 1869 Newspaper Tax Reform
Number of Newspapers
Population:
1869 Censusa
(#1,000)
Before the 1869
Tax Repeal
After the 1869
Tax Repeal
Newspapers were added:
Amsterdam 5 10 264.1
Rotterdam 1 4 117.1
The Hague 1 2 91.3
Groningen 2 3 38.0
Arnhem 1 3 32.3
Maastricht 2 3 28.5
’s Hertogenbosch 2 3 24.4
Total 14 28 595.7
Newspapers first appeared:
Tilburg 0 1 21.4
Den Helder 0 1 18.5
Deventer 0 1 17.8
Harlingen 0 1 9.9
Roosendaal 0 1 7.6
Winschoten 0 1 5.5
Enkhuizen 0 1 5.4
Total 0 7 86.3
Number of newspapers (10) did not change:
Utrecht 2 2 60.4
Leiden 2 2 39.3
Nijmegen 2 2 23.0
Haarlem 1 1 31.0
Leeuwarden 1 1 26.0
Dordrecht 1 1 24.8
Delft 1 1 22.0
Zwolle 1 1 20.6
Schiedam 1 1 19.3
Middelburg 1 1 16.6
Gouda 1 1 16.0
Breda 1 1 15.2
Kampen 1 1 14.7
Zutphen 1 1 14.6
Amersfoort 1 1 13.3
Alkmaar 1 1 11.4
Almelo 1 1 10.3
Vlissingen 1 1 9.6
Roermond 1 1 9.2
Tiel 1 1 8.1
Zierikzee 1 1 7.7
Assen 1 1 6.9
Enschede 1 1 5.1
Heerlen 1 1 5.0
Schagen 1 1 2.5
Total 28 28 432.7
a Central Bureau of Statistics Netherlands, Publicaties Volkstellingen 1795–1971 (1999).
74 the journal of law and economics
Figure 4.—Map of entry locations and major towns in the Netherlands. Source.—http://
www.mapquest.com (downloaded October 21, 2001).
were added right after the tax repeal. In 1871, the average population per
available newspaper had fallen from 24,500 to 17,700 people. The city of
’s Hertogenbosch was, with 24,400 inhabitants, the smallest town that added
a newspaper to existing ones.
For our empirical analysis, we define the choice set of towns that could
have introduced a new journal after the repeal of the Stamped Paper Tax as
all existing Dutch towns in 1869 with at least 5,000 citizens.12 Figure 4 shows
a map of entry locations and all major towns in the Netherlands. It separately
identifies the towns where entry occurred. For each town in the data set, the
census data include the town’s size in thousands of people (Pop1000), the
percentage of population growth between 1859 and 1869 (PerGrPop), the
average number of people in a single household (PopPerHs), the town’s
surface area (Area), the number of people per square kilometer (PopArea),
and the ratio of unoccupied to occupied houses (EFs). Unfortunately, the
census data do not include literacy data or wealth data. We think of the
12 The town of Schagen was smaller than that. Its newspaper was introduced in 1850 shortly
after the establishment of the New Constitution. In the analysis of towns that were most likely
to add a newspaper after 1869, we disregard all existing towns with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants
in 1869. The reason behind this choice is that it leaves out a large number of small towns
where nothing happened as a result of the 1869 tax cut (dropping many uninformative zeros
from the probability analysis). The definition of the choice set has the one minor drawback
that Schagen is thus excluded from the analysis.
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TABLE 4
Demographics of Dutch Towns with and without Newspapers
Towns without
Newspapers
(≥5,000 People)
Single
Newspaper
Multiple
Newspapers
Pre-1869 Post-1869 Pre-1869 Post-1869 Pre-1869 Post-1869
Number of towns 45 38 24 28 7 10
Population variables:
Pop1000 8.21
(3.41)
7.45
(1.57)
22.8
(26.5)
14.1
(7.06)
68.3
(87.2)
71.9
(74.3)
PerGrPop 8.02
(3.94)
7.32
(2.39)
7.37
(6.58)
7.60
(6.63)
7.37
(2.41)
9.84
(5.49)
PopPerHs 5.50
(1.04)
5.52
(1.08)
5.83
(1.25)
5.55
(.84)
7.75
(2.17)
7.65
(2.13)
PopArea 6.20
(14.9)
4.05
(5.77)
23.8
(27.7)
19.7
(26.0)
74.2
(82.6)
66.7
(72.3)
Other demographic
variables:
Area 3.85
(2.44)
3.95
(2.39)
2.00
(1.84)
2.18
(2.05)
1.73
(1.35)
2.22
(1.95)
Dist .357
(.222)
.327
(.206)
.247
(.206)
.332
(.240)
.080
(.144)
.082
(.137)
EFs 6.33
(5.58)
6.84
(5.84)
10.4
(7.36)
8.78
(7.53)
9.11
(8.03)
9.28
(6.69)
Note.—Standard deviations are in parentheses.
variables PopPerHs and EFs as proxies for a town’s wealth and assume that
wealthier towns have fewer occupants per household and fewer empty houses.
We also measured the distance in kilometers from the town to the largest
city of the province (Dist).
Table 4 presents 1869 demographic characteristics of all 76 existing towns
with a minimum population of 5,000 citizens. The average population of
multiple-newspaper towns before the 1869 tax cut is 3 times as large as that
of single-newspaper towns and 5 times as large afterward. While on average
the size of single-newspaper towns decreased, for towns that accommodated
more than one newspaper it actually went up. Newspapers were added in
towns with larger than average population growth during the previous decade
and lower population density than existing newspaper towns. Of the two
variables that are available to us as proxies of a town’s relative wealth,
PopPerHs and EFs, the first does not show much variation, while the second
one does. New single-newspaper towns had lower average rates of unoc-
cupied houses. They were also located at a greater distance from the prov-
inces’ biggest cities.
We can also look at the demographic variation among existing newspapers,
newspapers that entered as monopolists, and those entering as competitors
in multifirm markets. Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics for the three
categories of newspapers. Important differences among them can immediately
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TABLE 5
Descriptive Statistics for Three Types of Newspapers
Existing
Newspapers
(41 Firms)
First Entry
(7 Firms)
entry into
existing market
(14 Firms)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Firm-specific variables:
YrEntry 1,820 49.7 1,870 .488 1,870 .534
OrderE 1.36 .859 1 0 4.64 2.79
Market-specific variables:
Pop1000 56.0 81.5 12.4 6.79 137.1 103.8
PerGrPop 7.46 5.17 11.8 7.67 10.7 5.62
PopPerHs 6.86 2.11 5.38 .788 8.99 2.34
Dist 17.2 19.8 51.7 25.3 1.86 6.95
EFs .093 .076 .036 .028 .057 .047
Note.—SD: standard deviation. YrEntry p year of entry; OrderE p order of entry.
be observed. First, monopolist firms entered small towns, while oligopoly
firms entered large cities. Second, monopolist firms popped up in faraway
towns. Third, both types of entrants chose towns that had seen more than
average population growth over the decade preceding the 1869 tax repeal.
Fourth, both types of entrants chose towns with a lower percentage of un-
occupied houses than existing newspapers. Fifth, entrants in concentrated
multifirm markets settled in towns with a large number of people per
household.
The 1869 tax reform act can be regarded as a quasi experiment that pro-
duced information necessary to investigate the effects of changes in taxation
on variable production costs and market structure. We will estimate how the
tax cut changed the competition and profitability in markets with one or more
newspaper firms. We are seeking answers as to why two-thirds of all new
firms entered large cities already served by newspapers, while only one-third
entered small towns as monopolists and why no entry occurred in a majority
of towns already served by one or two newspapers. A town-specific econ-
ometric analysis of the 76 Dutch towns that had 5,000 or more inhabitants
in 1869 is presented next.
A. The Econometric Entry Threshold Model
Before 1869, the number of towns without any newspapers was M pt
, the number of towns served by a single newspaper was , and45 N p 241t
the number of multiple-newspaper towns was . In the 2 years afterN p 72t
the 1869 tax repeal , these numbers changed to ,(tp 0) M p 38 N p0 10
, and .28 N p 1020
We consider the following market structures. When no newspaper is avail-
able, profits for newspaper firms are below zero ( ). If the town hasP ! 01t
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one newspaper, we assume that and . For towns with moreP p 0 P ! 01t 2t
than one newspaper, we have . Lacking observations on profits, weP ≥ 02t
assume that all firms in one town experience the same profit and write the
total profits averaged over all towns with J firms net of taxes as follows:
P p a S W  JF   , Jp 0, 1, 2, (11)Jt t Jt Jt Jt Jt
where , represents the setup costs per firm for towns[a/(a1)]a { (1 t) Ft J
accommodating J firms, and is a normally distributed unobserved randomJ
error. Equation (11) allows us to write down an ordered-probability model
of newspaper provision in Dutch towns before ( ) and after ( ) thet 1 0 tp 0
repeal of the Stamped Paper Tax. For towns without newspapers we have
Pr (P ! 0)p 1 F(a W S  F ), (12a)1t t 1t 1t 1t
for towns with one newspaper, we have
Pr (P ≥ 0, P ! 0)p F(a W S  F ) F(a W S  2F ), (12b)1t 2t t 1t 1t 1t t 2t 2t 2t
and for towns with two or more newspapers, we have
Pr (P ≥ 0)p F(a W S  2F ), (12c)2t t 2t 2t 2t
where F(.) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function,
is the break-even point for monopoly entry, and pa W S p F a W St 1t 1t 1t t 2t 2t
is the break-even point for duopoly entry.2F2t
The econometric model is specified in the following way:
a W S p a (Pop1,000 d PerGrPop) b Dist ,t 1t 1t t t 1t 1
F p w  g EFs
(13a)
1t 1t 1t 1
and
a W S p a (Pop1,000 d PerGrPop) b Dist ,t 2t 2t t t 2t 2
2F p w  g EFs .
(13b)
2t 2t 2t 2
Each town’s net present value of revenues is estimated as the linear com-
bination of total population in thousands of inhabitants (Pop1000) and the
growth of the population between 1859 and 1869 (PerGrPop). The variable
profits of a monopolist are proxied by the covariate Dist1, which measures
the distance (in 100s km) to the province’s largest town for all cities that do
not accommodate more than one newspaper; the variable profits of a town
that accommodates more than one newspaper are proxied by the covariate
Dist2, which measures the distance (in 100s km) to the province’s largest
town for all cities that do not accommodate one newspaper. Theory predicts
a positive effect of profits on the size of the population . Given that(a 1 0)t
fixed costs of entry are nonzero, we expect that larger population growth
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rates reduce the time firms spend waiting for entry.13 The higher the growth
rate of the population, the more likely it is that entry is observed in a
concentrated market . Entry into monopoly markets is predicted to(d ! 0)t
generate a drop in variable profits, so that .b 1 b1t 2t
Setup costs for a monopolist are approximated by the covariate EFs1 that
contains the ratio of unoccupied to occupied houses for all cities that do not
accommodate more than one newspaper. The term EFs1 is considered to
capture, at least in part, possible wealth differences among towns. Wealthier
towns have fewer unoccupied houses and thus a lower EFs1 ratio. In wealthier
towns, the same setup costs for first entrants form a lesser entry barrier when
the expected revenues are higher. Advertising expenditures, for example,
necessary to obtain a particular market size are sunk setup costs. When the
public purchasing power is higher and more people are able to buy the new
good, advertising costs to achieve a given market size can be lower. Setup
costs are thus inversely related to a town’s wealth. If the ratio of unoccupied
to occupied housing is high in comparison with other towns, that town is
thought to be less wealthy. Its setup costs are higher; it takes longer to earn
back sunk investments since profits are lower. The null hypothesis of this
test would then be that the probability that profits would be positive is lower,
or . Changes in setup costs in markets with more than one newspaperg 1 01t
are captured by the variable EFs2, which contains the ratio of unoccupied to
occupied houses for all cities that do not accommodate one newspaper. If
setup costs are higher when markets are more concentrated, then .g 1 g1t 2t
Table 6 presents the estimation results of the ordered entry probabilities.
Despite the model’s scarce parameterization, it predicts the percentages of
firms in each category well. In equation (1), we assumed a constant returns-
to-scale technology of the production of new goods. The assumption itself
is difficult to test, but if it is correct then we can identify the technology
parameter a from the fact that
ˆ ˆD log (a /a )0 t
aˆp , with D{ .
1 D log (1 t)
The elimination of tax stamps on paper used for news provision reduced the
variable costs of production by approximately 50 percent.14 Before the tax
repeal we thus have , whereas after the tax change, . Table 6tp 1 tp 0
shows that and . We thus estimate (standardˆ ˆ ˆa p .024 a p .243 ap .771t 0
erro ), given . This result suggests that the production tech-rp .258 tp 1
13 Avinash K. Dixit, Entry and Exit Decisions under Uncertainty, 97 J. Pol. Econ. 620 (1989),
models entry and exit decisions under uncertainty and shows that under fixed-costs regimes
the option value associated with the irreversibility of spending these costs can lead to an
optimal regime of waiting to invest.
14 See Hemels, Het Dagbladzegel in de Rariteitenkamer, supra note 7; Hemels, De Pers onder
het Juk van een Fiscale Druk, supra note 7.
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TABLE 6
Ordered Entry Probabilities before and after the 1869 Tax Reform
Pre-1869 Tax Reform Post-1869 Tax Reform
Estimates
Standard
Error Estimates
Standard
Error
Variables:
Pop1000 (a) .024* .010 .243** .059
PerGrPop (ad) .050 .038 .104* .050
Dist1 ( )b1 .019 1.19 2.60 1.41
Dist2 ( )b2 11.3** 2.58 13.1** 3.82
EFs1 ( )g1 6.89* 2.87 6.72 3.60
EFs2 ( )g2 8.78* 3.97 9.26 5.01
Cut points:
ˆw1 1.39** .589 .79 .84
ˆw2 .81 .583 5.68** 1.58
Mean
Standard
Deviation Mean
Standard
Deviation
Predicted profits:
(no newspaper)ˆP0 4.10 2.49 2.21 2.13
(single newspaper)ˆP1 .520 .819 2.89* 1.53
(multiple newspapers)ˆP2 1.15 2.36 16.2 18.1
True Predicted True Predicted
Model specification tests:
% (no newspaper)N0 59.2 59.6 50.0 49.9
% (single newspaper)N1 31.6 31.0 36.8 36.6
% (multiple newspapers)N2 9.2 9.4 13.2 13.5
Likelihood ratio test,
x2 by equation (5) 71.5*** 115.2***
Pseudo- 2R .526 .773
Note.—N p 76.
* p-value  [.01; .05].
** p-value ! .01.
*** p-value p .000.
nology of new goods used a capital-labor input ratio that is comparable to
that of the twentieth century’s industrialized economies.
The probability of having a profitable newspaper introduced in a city
without a newspaper before 1869 increased from 8/45 to 14/45, or 13.3
percent. Figure 5 shows how the probability of having a profitable monopolist
newspaper before the repeal of the Stamped Paper Tax varies with the size
of the population. Figure 6 shows the same probability distribution afterward.
The dots in both Figures 5 and 6 represent towns that were excluded from
newspapers before as well as after the shock. The plus signs are towns that
did not have a newspaper before the tax shock but saw entry of a monopolist
news provider as a result of the change in the tax law. Comparing Figures
5 and 6 reveals how fiscal policy can contribute to potential market expansion
and how the decrease in minimum efficient scale broadened the availability
of newspapers.
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Figure 5.—Pre-1869 probability of a profitable single-newspaper entry
The estimated averages of the predicted profits, , suggest a substantialˆPJ
increase of profitability in all sectors after the 1869 tax reform. That ˆw !1
before the repeal is evidence of the fact that preceding the 1869 tax law0
many of the existing monopolist newspapers were performing unprofitably,
possibly because they received subsidies, as they were the official—
controlled—information platforms of the local governments. These subsidies
were discontinued after the tax repeal to balance budgets. The parameter
estimates are also in accordance with the theoretical predictions. Interestingly,
we find that monopolies were not likely to be found in the neighborhood of
the provinces’ largest cities. Setup costs are found to be inversely related to
the concentration of the market . And indeed, before as well asˆ ˆ(g 1 g )1t 2t
after the repeal, wealthier towns had lower setup costs .ˆ(g ! 0)2t
Given the distance from the nearest large city, the choice of the city in
which to set up new businesses depends on the city’s recent growth in
population. The fact that the towns chosen had the largest population growth
shows that the rationality of the newspaper entrepreneurs in the nineteenth
century was no different from what it is today. This has clear policy impli-
cations for local governments. If the most thriving towns—those towns that
people choose to live in—have the highest probability of being chosen as
the most profitable business locations, then not only fiscal incentives matter
for business location choices. In addition, governmental policies aimed at
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Figure 6.—Post-1869 probability of a profitable single-newspaper entry
making a town attractive to live in adds to its future economic prosperity as
well.
B. The Effect of the 1869 Tax Repeal on Competition
and Market Structure
The results from Table 6 allow us to compute the change in competition
between different market structures. The threshold population sizes for single-
and multiple-firm markets are computed as follows:
ˆ ˆ ˆ˜ ( )ˆˆ ˆS p w  a d PerGrPop  b Dist  g EFs /a1t 1t t t 1t 1t tt 1t 1t
and
tˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ˜
ˆS p w  a d PerGrPop  (b Dist  b Dist )[2t 2t t t 1t 2tt 1 2t
ˆ ˆ ˆ (g EFs  g EFs ) /a ,]1t 2t t1t 2t
where the upper bars refer to the within-group variable means before and
after the shock. The entry thresholds are then computed as ˜ ˜s /s p2t 1t
. The results of this exercise are presented in Table 7. They show˜ ˜(S /2) /S2t 1t
a substantial decrease in the minimum efficient scale for all market structures
as a result of the abolishment of the Stamped Paper Tax. This confirms the
prediction of the theoretical model that , and it is consistent withS(t) 1 S(0)
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TABLE 7
Changes in Competition due to the 1869 Tax Reform Act
˜S1 ˜S2 ˜S /22 ˜ ˜S /S2 1
Before 1869 tax reform 34,319a 93,013 46,507 1.355
After 1869 tax reform 5,350 27,698 13,849 2.589
a Since , we used .ˆ ˆw ! 0 w p 01 1
recent findings for the United States that the scale of local production depends
on the size of the city chosen.15 Table 7 also shows that as a result of the
tax repeal, the profitability for each firm in multiple-firm markets almost
doubled, rising from 1.36 to 2.59, which confirms the theoretical prediction
that .dP/dt ! 0
V. Conclusions
In this paper, we designed a model of what happened in 1869 when the
Netherlands repealed a newspaper stamp tax. Firms’ variable costs declined,
and new newspapers entered in response. The quasi experiment is used to
draw inferences about newspapers’ unobserved profits. The results show that
the tax significantly lowered the population necessary to support a given
market structure. We find that this particular relaxing of fiscal policy had a
large impact on location choices of firms and the availability of new products.
The choice of where to start a new business depends on the growth in
demand (population) of potential locations (markets, cities). In our analysis,
we measured the growth of a decade. Our results have important policy
implications. Cities aiming at prosperity compete for growth. Successful ones
see more people choosing to live and work there. As a result, new businesses
are founded. Fiscal incentives thus matter for business location choices. But
perhaps more vital is the fact that thriving policy endears a town to people
who are positively inclined toward working for future wealth.
The results presented in this paper are of general interest and can support
any policy-related debate about the effects of taxation and entry limitation
on profitability, market structures, location choices, development, and the
growth of new industries and of emerging markets. Although of historical
interest as well and holding true for a specific industry in a small open
economy, the study’s broader contribution is to a better understanding of the
relation between fiscal policy and industrial organization. The 1869 tax re-
form act stimulated the profitability of firms, encouraged markets to grow,
advanced competition, and boosted the development of the young and en-
trepreneurial industry of daily newspapers. Fiscal policy that suppresses the
spread of knowledge to the general public is shown to undermine economic
15 Holmes, Scale of Local Production and City Size, supra note 3.
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growth, development, and prosperity. After more than 150 years of freedom
of speech, the topic of government intervention in the availability of infor-
mation cannot be of more relevance than it is today, when the new multimedia
communication opportunities challenge governments to face the increasing
worldwide trade possibilities through internet exchange and to decide whether
and how to develop fiscal policies for electronic trade for financing their own
future prosperity.
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